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Foot Voting, Decentralization, and 
Development 
Ilya Somin† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Most debates over development focus on the question of 
how new wealth can be created in a given area—bringing 
growth to where people currently are. But, historically, devel-
opment has often been driven by the ability of people to vote 
with their feet for greener pastures—bringing people to where 
they can produce more growth. In many cases, the best way to 
create new development is to facilitate foot voting by decentral-
izing political power and breaking down obstacles to mobility.  
When people are able vote with their feet in favor of areas 
with greater opportunity, development follows. That is true 
both when they engage in internal foot voting within a federal 
system, and when they do so across international boundaries. 
The effects of both types of foot voting are often spectacular. As 
Harvard economist and former Secretary of the Treasury Larry 
Summers puts it, “I do not think there is a more important de-
velopment issue than getting questions of migration right.”1 
This Article discusses the implications of foot voting for de-
velopment and outlines several institutional strategies for ex-
panding foot voting opportunities. It provides a general outline 
of some themes that will be explored in greater depth in my 
book Free to Move: Foot Voting and Political Freedom.2  
 
†  Professor of Law, George Mason University. Parts of this Article draw 
on my forthcoming book, FREE TO MOVE: FOOT VOTING AND POLITICAL FREE-
DOM. For helpful suggestions, I would like to thank Michael Clemens, Richard 
Epstein, Bradley Gardner, Roderick Hills, Alex Nowrasteh, and participants 
in the Hong Kong University conference on Decentralization and Develop-
ment. Copyright © 2018 by Ilya Somin. 
 1. Lawrence H. Summers, Rethinking Global Development Policy for the 
21st Century, Speech at the Ctr. for Glob. Dev. (Nov. 8, 2017). 
 2. (Oxford Univ. Press forthcoming) [hereinafter SOMIN, FREE TO MOVE]. 
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Part I summarizes the vast development benefits of foot 
voting. Among other things, migration can enable effective ex-
ploitation of place premiums—situations where a given indi-
vidual is likely to be more productive in one location than an-
other.3 The magnitude of place premiums is often enormously 
great. Exploiting them effectively can do more to promote de-
velopment than most, if not all, other policy reforms. This is 
true both for international place premiums and domestic ones. 
Part II explains how foot voting can provide a powerful 
mechanism of political freedom: enabling migrants to choose 
those public policies that best fit their needs. In some crucial 
respects, foot voting is superior to conventional ballot-box vot-
ing. Relative to ballot-box voters, foot voters have stronger in-
centives to seek out relevant information, and to use it effec-
tively. They also benefit in other ways from the ability to make 
a decisive choice about the policies they wish to live under, as 
opposed to a system where they only have the power to cast one 
vote out of many thousands or millions. In authoritarian socie-
ties or poorly established democracies, foot voting may be the 
only realistically feasible mechanism of political choice for most 
of the population. The superior decision-making enabled by foot 
voting increases people’s ability to seek out opportunities and 
promote development. 
Part III considers the institutional implications of the case 
for foot voting. Domestically, we can expand foot-voting oppor-
tunities by decentralizing political power and by breaking down 
barriers to interjurisdictional mobility. Special measures may 
be needed to facilitate foot voting in federal systems where ju-
risdictional lines track deep ethnic or religious divisions. Inter-
nationally, foot-voting opportunities can be enhanced by lower-
ing barriers to immigration and developing institutional 
mechanisms to deal with potential negative side effects of free-
dom of movement. 
Foot voting is not a panacea for all development problems, 
and it certainly is not a perfect free lunch without downsides. 
But we should nonetheless strive to capture its truly enormous 
advantages. It is difficult to think of any other development ini-
tiative that can bring such vast benefits to so many people. 
 
 3. See generally Michael A. Clemens, et al., The Place Premium: Wage 
Differences for Identical Workers Across the US Border 1 (Ctr. for Glob. Dev., 
Working Paper No. 148, 2009) (discussing the “place premium” immigrants 
from different countries secure by moving to the United States). 
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I.  PLACE PREMIUMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
BENEFITS OF FOOT VOTING   
One of the most important findings of modern development 
economics is that people are often more productive if they move 
to a new location—even if their personal characteristics and job 
skills do not change.4 This might occur because one location has 
a greater amount of capital to combine with the labor in ques-
tion. A factory worker, for instance, might move to a region 
where his labor is more productive because there are more and 
better production facilities for him to utilize. Alternatively, the 
migrant may be more productive in a new region because it has 
a natural advantage. For example, a farmer is likely to produce 
more valuable crops in an area where the soil is richer. 
But an even more important reason for place premiums is 
that some areas have better economic and political institutions 
than others. For example, a Mexican can increase his or her 
productivity several-fold simply by crossing over into the Unit-
ed States.5 The main difference between the United States and 
Mexico is not greater natural resources or even greater physical 
capital, but superior legal, political, and economic institutions.6 
Place premiums also enable increased productivity through 
internal migration. The early twentieth-century movement of 
African Americans from the South to the North enabled many 
to increase their incomes by becoming more productive.7 Some 
of the difference was due to greater availability of industrial 
capital in the northern states, but some was also due to greater 
freedom for blacks in states where their economic opportunities 
were less limited by discrimination and legally enforced segre-
gation.8 Today, growing barriers to interjurisdictional mobility 
are a significant obstacle to economic growth in the United 
 
 4. See id. at 33–34 (reviewing the evidence). 
 5. See id. at 41 tbl.8 (reviewing the data). 
 6. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS 
FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2013) (discussing 
the importance of institutions for development). 
 7. For a discussion of some of the relevant evidence, see, for example, 
FLORETTE HENRI, BLACK MIGRATION 133 (1975); Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Fed-
eralism, and Political Freedom, in NOMOS: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 83 
(Jacob Levy & James Fleming eds., 2014) [hereinafter Somin, Foot Voting].  
 8. For citations to relevant literature, see Somin, Foot Voting, supra 
note 7. 
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States, artificially depressing incomes for the poor and disad-
vantaged.9 
In poor countries, increased development is often driven in 
large part by the migration of rural people to cities, where 
there are greater job opportunities. In China—the most dra-
matic recent example of this phenomenon—some 260 million 
people migrated from rural to urban areas between 1978 and 
2012, usually for economic reasons.10 Much of the migration 
flow is towards special economic zones with better institu-
tions.11 This massive migration has been an important factor in 
the country’s rapid economic development, accounting for 
somewhere between twenty and thirty-three percent of the stu-
pendous economic growth China experienced from the late 
1970s to the present.12 
The importance of place premiums is underscored by the 
reality that the ultimate purpose of economic development is 
not to increase production in a particular location but to in-
crease the well-being of people, regardless of where they might 
be located. As economists Michael Clemens and Lant Pritchett 
put it, we should seek to maximize “income per natural [per-
son]” rather than per capita income in a particular location.13 
Even if per capita income within the territory of Country X or 
Region Y remains the same, development has still increased if 
a substantial proportion of the population of X or Y are able to 
move to a different location where they can be more productive, 
earn higher incomes, and otherwise increase their well-being.14 
 
 9. For good overviews of the issues, see David Schleicher, Getting People 
Where the Jobs Are, DEMOCRACY (Fall 2016), http://democracyjournal.org/ 
magazine/42/getting-people-where-the-jobs-are; and David Schleicher, Stuck! 
The Law and the Economics of Residential Stability, 127 YALE L.J. 78 (2017) 
[hereinafter Schleicher, Stuck!]. 
 10. See BRADLEY M. GARDNER, CHINA’S GREAT MIGRATION: HOW THE 
POOR BUILT A PROSPEROUS NATION 5 (2017); cf. Xiaochu Hu, China’s Young 
Rural-to-Urban Migrants: In Search of Fortune, Happiness, and Independence, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ 
chinas-young-rural-urban-migrants-search-fortune-happiness-and 
-independence (estimating a total of 145 million internal rural-to-urban mi-
grants as of 2009). 
 11. See Thomas Gries et al., Explaining Inter-provincial Migration in 
China, 95 PAPERS REG’L SCI. 709, 713 (2016). 
 12. GARDNER, supra note 10, at 72. 
 13. Michael A. Clemens & Lant Pritchett, Income Per Natural: Measuring 
Development for People Rather than Places, 34 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 395, 
396 (2008). 
 14. Id. 
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Greater development can potentially be stimulated by ex-
panding opportunities for people to vote with their feet and 
take better advantage of place premiums. Economists estimate 
that the establishment of free migration throughout the world 
could as much as double world GDP.15 Even if this estimate 
overly optimistic by a large margin, it still implies that elimi-
nating migration restrictions would have an enormous impact 
on development.16 It is difficult to think of any other policy 
change that can achieve even remotely comparable gains. Even 
more modest increases in migration rights could potentially re-
sult in greatly increased development. 
Obstacles to free internal migration also block valuable de-
velopment in many countries, both underdeveloped nations and 
more advanced ones. In China, for example, many millions of 
people are blocked from seeking out valuable job opportunities 
by the Hukou system of residency permits, which is only grad-
ually being reformed.17 In the United States, the poor and low-
er middle class are often impeded from moving towards job op-
portunities by restrictive zoning laws, and occupational 
licensing regimes that exclude newcomers from numerous pro-
fessions.18  
The impact of zoning is particularly egregious, insofar as it 
prices out poor and lower-middle-class migrants from areas 
with strong job markets.19 A recent study suggests that if the 
level of zoning in the United States were reduced to that of the 
 
 15. See Michael A. Clemens, Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar 
Bills Left on the Sidewalk?, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 83 (2011). 
 16. For claims that migration restrictions do not much affect productivity 
because few additional people would migrate if they were eliminated, see 
GEORGE J. BORJAS, IMMIGRATION ECONOMICS 168 (2014). For a critique of the 
serious analytical and empirical errors in Borjas’ argument, see Michael A. 
Clemens & Lant Pritchett, The New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions: 
An Assessment 12–13 (Ctr. for Glob. Dev., Working Paper. No. 423, 
2016), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-Working-Paper-423 
-Clemens-Pritchett-New-Econ-Case-Migration_0.pdf. 
 17. See Shannon Tiezzi, China’s Plan for “Orderly” Hukou Reform, DIP-
LOMAT (Feb. 3, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/chinas-plan-for-orderly 
-hukou-reform; see also GARDNER, supra note 10, at 19–21, 26–27 (describing 
the obstacles the hukou system creates for would-be migrants). 
 18. See Schleicher, Stuck!, supra note 9, at 117; Ilya Somin, Moving Vans 
More Powerful Than Ballot Boxes, USA TODAY (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www 
.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/10/18/mobility-zoning-licensing-voting 
-minorities-column/91990486. 
 19. See Schleicher, Stuck!, supra note 9, at 129; see also Edward Glaeser, 
Reforming Land Use Regulations, BROOKINGS INST. (April 24, 2017), https:// 
www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-land-use-regulations/amp (providing 
an overview of the evidence). 
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median American city, the nation could achieve as much as a 
9.5% increase in GDP.20 Land-use restrictions also severely 
constrain foot-voting opportunities in China, among other plac-
es.21 
The harm inflicted by migration restrictions goes far be-
yond the narrowly economic. Expanded foot-voting opportuni-
ties can also massively enhance migrants’ freedom and well-
being more generally. Consider, for example, women fleeing pa-
triarchal societies, religious minorities fleeing oppression, and 
people fleeing repressive tyrannical regimes of various kinds. 
In many cases, the potential gains here are as great or greater 
than the purely economic benefits of foot voting. 
If development is viewed in the broader sense of expanding 
human capabilities,22 then the noneconomic benefits of foot vot-
ing are likely just as important as those that relate to increas-
ing productivity, conceived in narrow economic terms. In many 
cases, escaping from noneconomic oppression enables migrants 
to enormously enhance their capacities in a variety of ways. 
The case of women escaping from patriarchal societies where 
they have little opportunity to seek an education or other op-
portunities is a particularly dramatic example. The same goes 
for religious and ethnic minorities escaping persecution and 
discrimination, political dissenters fleeing oppression, and oth-
ers whose prospects are artificially constrained by repressive 
regimes. 
What is true for international migration is also often true 
for internal movement. In many countries, some regions offer 
greater freedom and equality than others, and migration can 
 
 20. See Chang Tai-Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spa-
tial Misallocation 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 
21154, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21154; see also Peter Ganong & 
Daniel W. Shoag, Why Has Regional Economic Convergence in the US De-
clined? 30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23609, 2017), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23609 (providing evidence that zoning barriers 
to migration have greatly slowed economic growth and cut off poor workers 
from job opportunities). For an overview of the evidence, see Glaeser, supra 
note 19. 
 21. For a description of the China case, see Wendell Pritchett & Shitong 
Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000724. 
 22. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 92 (1999) (“[T]he 
enhancement of human capabilities also tends to go with an expansion of 
productivities and earning power. That connection establishes an important 
indirect linkage through which capability improvement helps both directly and 
indirectly in enriching human lives and in making human deprivations more 
rare and less acute.”). 
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help millions of people enjoy the advantages of the former. In 
addition to the economic place premium, there is also often 
what we may call the freedom premium or justice premium to 
expanding mobility. 
II.  FOOT VOTING AS A SUPERIOR MECHANISM OF 
POLITICAL CHOICE   
Ballot-box voting is usually seen as the essence of political 
freedom and the main mechanism by which most ordinary peo-
ple exercise political choice. The democratic process has im-
portant virtues, but it also has two serious shortcomings: indi-
vidual voters have almost no chance of actually affecting the 
outcome of most elections; and they usually have little or no in-
centive to make an informed choice. Foot voting is superior on 
both counts. That makes it a powerful mechanism for enabling 
would-be migrants to seek out opportunities that expand devel-
opment. 
A. IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL VOTERS 
In most contexts, we would not say that a person has 
meaningful freedom if they have only a one-in-one-million or 
one-in-a-hundred-million chance of making a choice that actu-
ally makes a difference. For example, a person has little, if any, 
religious freedom if they have only an infinitesimal likelihood 
of being able to determine which religion they wish to practice. 
The same is true for political choice. As political theorist Rus-
sell Hardin put it, “most citizens do not typically have the liber-
ty actually to make any difference to their own welfare through 
politics.”23 Hardin notes that “if my vote is worthless . . . 
[h]aving the liberty to cast it is roughly as valuable as having 
the liberty to cast a vote on whether the sun will rise tomor-
row.”24 
It is not true that the liberty to cast a vote is completely 
worthless. At least ex ante, there is a very small chance that it 
will swing an electoral outcome. And if that scenario actually 
occurs, an individual vote could have great value.25 This is ar-
guably a sufficient reason to make it instrumentally rational to 
 
 23. RUSSELL HARDIN, HOW DO YOU KNOW? THE ECONOMICS OF ORDINARY 
KNOWLEDGE 93 (2009). 
 24. Id. 
 25. ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER 
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 80 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter SOMIN, DEMOCRACY 
AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE]. 
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vote, so long as the cost of voting is low.26 But a form of freedom 
that is not completely worthless may still be highly attenuated, 
and greatly inferior, to one where more meaningful choice is 
possible. 
A small percentage of the population has the ability to in-
fluence political outcomes by means other than voting. For ex-
ample, some can do so through lobbying, campaign contribu-
tions, or becoming influential political activists or leaders.27 
However, very few have more than a minimal chance of influ-
encing public policy by these mechanisms. Using them effec-
tively usually requires time, skills, and resources that most or-
dinary citizens do not have.28 Moreover, to the extent that a 
few people do wield disproportionate political influence by these 
means, it only further diminishes the power of the rest of the 
population.29 
B.  LACK OF INCENTIVE TO MAKE AN INFORMED CHOICE 
On many normative views of freedom, its effective exercise 
requires at least a reasonably informed choice, as well as one 
that has a real chance of making a difference. For example, 
medical ethicists hold that doctors should generally not per-
form operations unless they first get the patient’s informed 
consent.30 As the American Medical Association Code of Medi-
cal Ethics puts it, “The patient’s right of self-decision can be ef-
fectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough infor-
mation to enable an informed choice.”31 Like medical decisions, 
political choices also are often literally matters of life and 
death. For millions of people, the outcome of an election might 
make the difference between war and peace, wealth and pov-
erty, or sickness and health. 
Unfortunately, the low likelihood of decisiveness also cre-
ates powerful incentives for voters to make poorly informed 
 
 26. For a detailed discussion, see id. at 79–84; see also DEREK PARFIT, 
REASONS AND PERSONS 73–75 (1984) (arguing that an extremely small chance 
of achieving a particular outcome has rational and moral significance when 
that outcome affects a large number of people). 
 27. SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY 42 (1995). 
 28. See, e.g., id. at 186 (describing how political influence by means of 
mechanisms beyond voting is enjoyed by only a small minority of the popula-
tion). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Opinion 8.08–Informed Consent, 14 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 555, 
555 (2012), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2012/07/pdf/coet1-1207.pdf. 
 31. Id. 
 2018] FOOT VOTING AND DECENTRALIZATION 1657 
 
choices. Precisely because there is so little chance that their 
votes will matter, ballot-box voters have strong incentives to be 
“rationally ignorant.”32 The phenomenon of rational ignorance 
afflicts voters in the United States and around the world.33 It 
affects virtually all those democracies for which we have rele-
vant survey data.34 Such ignorance reduces the quality of polit-
ical decision-making and inhibits development.35 
Survey data shows that voters often lack even very basic 
knowledge about the candidates and policy questions at issue 
in any given election.36 For example, during the 2014 U.S. mid-
term election, which focused on control of Congress, polls 
showed that only thirty-eight percent of the public knew which 
party controlled the House of Representatives before the elec-
tion, and the same percentage knew which party controlled the 
Senate.37 Voters also often have little understanding of how the 
government spends its money or which officials are responsible 
for which issues.38 
In addition to acquiring very little information, voters have 
little incentive to analyze what they do learn in a logical, unbi-
ased way.39 To the contrary, most have strong incentives to fall 
prey to “rational irrationality”: when there are few or no nega-
tive consequences to error, it is rational to make almost no ef-
fort to control one’s biases.40 
 
 32. Ilya Somin, Rational Ignorance, in ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK OF IGNORANCE STUDIES 274, 277 (Matthias Gross & Linsey 
McGoey eds., 2015). The theory of rational voter ignorance was first developed 
in ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238–59 (1957). 
 33. See Perceptions Are Not Reality: Things the World Gets Wrong, IPSOS 
MORI (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/ 
researcharchive/3466/Perceptions-are-not-reality-Things-the-world-gets 
-wrong.aspx (discussing survey data showing widespread public ignorance in 
numerous democracies). 
 34. For a recent comparative analysis of inaccuracies in public perceptions 
of political and economic issues in numerous democracies, see id. 
 35. See generally BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: 
WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007) (discussing how voter igno-
rance and irrationality lead to bad policy); SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL 
IGNORANCE, supra note 25 (discussing the extent and dangers of political igno-
rance). 
 36. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 
17–46 (detailing numerous studies showing voter ignorance). 
 37. Id. at 17. 
 38. Id. at 17–18, 117–19. 
 39. See CAPLAN, supra note 35, at 131–35 (explaining rational irrationali-
ty in the context of elections). 
 40. Id. at 74. 
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C. THE SUPERIORITY OF FOOT VOTING 
Foot voting is systematically superior to ballot-box voting 
on both decisiveness and incentives to acquire information.41 It 
enables the individual decision-maker to make a meaningful 
choice. When a potential migrant decides where to live, his or 
her decision is highly likely to make a real difference to the 
outcome. Even those who must secure the agreement of a 
spouse or other family member still generally have much great-
er clout than an average ballot-box voter in an election. 
And precisely because their decisions do actually matter, 
foot voters have strong incentives to acquire relevant infor-
mation and use it wisely. A person deciding where to live or 
what choices to make in the marketplace and civil society 
knows that her decisions have real consequences, and generally 
makes more effort to acquire relevant information. 
Considerable empirical evidence backs these theoretical 
deductions.42 For example, experiments show that people tend 
to process political information in a far more biased and less 
accurate way than otherwise similar information about nonpo-
litical issues.43 
Voters can sometimes offset the effects of political igno-
rance by relying on information shortcuts; small bits of 
knowledge that function as proxies for larger bodies of infor-
mation that they do not know.44 In my book Democracy and Po-
litical Ignorance, I discuss a variety of different shortcut mech-
anisms in detail, and explain why they are not nearly as 
 
 41. Id. at 138–45. For a discussion of moving costs and other factors that 
might inhibit effective choices for foot voters, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND PO-
LITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 165–76; infra Part III. 
 42. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 
136–81 (discussing relevant data and experiments). 
 43. See, e.g., id.; Dan M. Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy and Enlight-
ened Self-Government, 1 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 54, 54 (2017) (recounting experi-
ments in which subjects used their quantitative-reasoning capacity to selec-
tively conform their interpretation of data to the result more consistent with 
their political outlooks). 
 44. For arguments that shortcuts function well, see, for example, MORRIS 
P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 1–44 
(1981) (providing a detailed analysis of retrospective voting, an important type 
of information shortcut); ARTHUR LUPIA & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE 
DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 
(1998) (defending a variety of shortcuts); SAMUEL POPKIN, THE REASONING 
VOTER (1991) (arguing that shortcuts are effective). 
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effective as advocates claim.45 In some cases, they even make 
the situation worse, such as when voters routinely reward and 
punish incumbents for outcomes they did not cause.46 Similar 
weaknesses beset claims that the ignorance of individual voters 
does not matter because some sort of “miracle of aggregation” 
enables the electorate to attain collective wisdom despite it.47 
Here, I will only emphasize that, even if ballot-box voters can 
sometimes make reasonably good decisions, foot voters general-
ly do much better.48 
In some cases, the challenge facing both foot voters and 
ballot-box voters is not to effectively utilize existing infor-
mation, but to seek out new information that may not—as 
yet—be known to anyone.49 Here too, foot voters generally have 
better incentives than ballot-box voters.50 For the same reason 
that they have strong incentives to seek out and use existing 
knowledge, they are also incentivized to find new relevant 
knowledge.51 
If foot voters find new information that helps them make a 
better decision, the better-informed choice is likely to make an 
important difference in their lives. By contrast, a ballot-box 
voter who finds new information that might improve her ballot 
box decision-making has far less likelihood of gaining anything 
for her trouble. Her better-informed vote is still highly unlikely 
to make any difference. 
As Charles Tiebout showed in his classic article on the sub-
ject, foot-voting opportunities can enhance political choice even 
if jurisdictions make no special effort to attract migrants.52 In a 
world where all jurisdictions choose policies solely to please 
current residents, foot voting can still enhance choice by giving 
 
 45. SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 
106–35. 
 46. Id. at 117–19. 
 47. Id. at 127–34. For an important recent defense of a version of the 
“miracle of aggregation” theory, see HÉLЀNE LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REA-
SON: POLITICS, COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE OF THE MANY 156–
60 (2013). For my critique, see Ilya Somin, Why Political Ignorance Under-
mines the Wisdom of the Many, 26 CRITICAL REV. 151 (2014). 
 48. For an overview of the evidence, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITI-
CAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 148–58 (comparing multiple examples 
where foot voting was more effective than ballot box voting). 
 49. Id. at 164–65. 
 50. Id. 
 51. I discuss this issue in greater detail in id. 
 52. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416, 418 (1956). 
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potential migrants a wider range of options than they would 
have otherwise.53 Even if each jurisdiction’s policies are deter-
mined without reference to the needs of migrants, the oppor-
tunity to vote with your feet can enable many people to find lo-
cal or regional governments with policies better suited to their 
preferences.54 
But foot voting becomes an even more powerful mechanism 
for enhancing choice if regional governments have incentives to 
compete for residents.55 Competition for tax revenue leads ju-
risdictions to adopt policies that appeal to potential migrants, 
both individuals and businesses.56 That, in turn, can enhance 
their opportunities for choice, and promote greater economic 
development.57 Historically, job opportunities and a favorable 
economic climate are among the principal determinants of re-
gional migration.58 
Finally, it is important to recognize that foot voting may be 
the only possible mechanism of exercising political choice for 
the large part of the world’s population that live under authori-
tarian regimes or weakly established democracies. Freedom 
House estimates that some twenty-five percent of the world’s 
people live in “not free” undemocratic nations, and another 
thirty percent in ones that are only “partly free” (i.e., only part-
ly democratic).59 
III.  INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR A FOOT VOTING 
WORLD   
The development benefits of expanded foot voting are po-
tentially enormous. What can countries do to design institu-
tions that capture them, while minimizing potential downsides? 
 
 53. Cf. id. at 418 (“The greater the number of communities and the great-
er the variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realiz-
ing his preference position.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. For a fuller discussion, see Somin, Foot Voting, supra note 7, at 84. 
See also SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 
145–46. 
 56. SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 
145–46. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., supra Part I; cf. SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNO-
RANCE, supra note 25, at 166–67 (outlining the reasons for migrations between 
U.S. states). 
 59. Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world 
-2018 (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
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Ideally, institutions should be able to accommodate greatly ex-
panded foot voting across both domestic and international ju-
risdictional boundaries. In order to maximize development, 
countries must especially seek to expand foot-voting opportuni-
ties for the poor and oppressed of the world. It is here that the 
greatest gains can occur, both narrowly economic and other-
wise. 
A. FACILITATING DOMESTIC FOOT VOTING 
Promoting foot voting has a number of implications for do-
mestic constitutional structures. The most obvious and widely 
accepted is the idea that citizens should be able to move freely 
between subnational jurisdictions and that the latter should 
not be able to stop them from doing so.60 In the United States 
and other advanced democracies, such freedom of movement is 
largely taken for granted. As early as 1867, the Supreme Court 
struck down a state law imposing an exit tax on people seeking 
to migrate to other states.61  
Before the Civil War, however, state-imposed restrictions 
on internal migration were far from unusual, with many states 
excluding free African Americans, some categories of aliens, 
and those considered likely to become public charges.62 Today, 
internal restrictions on migration are far more common in poor 
nations. China’s hukou system is a particularly well-known and 
important example, because it affects so many people in the 
world’s most populous country.63 But regional governments in 
other developing nations also seek to restrict migration in vari-
ous ways. For example, some Indian states seek to keep out 
migrants from minority ethnic groups.64 Some ethnonationalist 
 
 60. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitu-
tional Design, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 202 (2011) (discussing this necessity) 
[hereinafter Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional De-
sign]. 
 61. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 49 (1867). 
 62. See MARILYN C. BASELER, ASYLUM FOR MANKIND: AMERICA 1607–
1800, at 190–309 (1998) (discussing state-level migration restrictions in eight-
eenth and nineteenth century America); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century 
of American Immigration Law, (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841–80 
(1993) (tracing U.S. immigration law in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries). 
 63. See discussion supra Part I. 
 64. For a recent overview, see Rameez Abbas & Divya Varma, Internal 
Labor Migration in India Raises Integration Challenges for Migrants, MIGRA-
TION POL’Y INST. (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ 
internal-labor-migration-india-raises-integration-challenges-migrants. 
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political leaders, such as those of the Shiv Sena Party in Maha-
rashtra, India, have even promoted violence against migrants 
in order to expel them and deter others from coming.65 
Well-designed constitutional systems can do much to en-
hance opportunities for foot voting, while minimizing potential 
downsides.66 At a bare minimum, effective foot voting requires 
preventing regional governments from either forcibly excluding 
migrants or preventing their own people from leaving. It also 
requires suppression of antimigrant violence. The latter may be 
difficult to achieve in areas where legal institutions are weak or 
corrupt and ethnic or religious hostilities between migrants 
and natives are severe. 
Internal foot voting can be further facilitated by enforce-
ment of relatively tight limits on the scope of central govern-
ment power, thereby devolving more issues to the regional or 
local level.67 That will ensure that more issues are subject to 
foot voting, with lower moving costs.68 In many situations, mov-
ing costs can be further reduced by devolving authority to the 
local level, rather than to regional authorities. It is much easier 
and cheaper to move from one nearby city or town to another 
than to move to a different region. 
Not all policy decisions can be devolved to lower-level gov-
ernments. Some problems are so large-scale that they can only 
be addressed by a national government, or perhaps even only 
through international cooperation. Global warming is an obvi-
ous example of the latter. 
But a wide range of issues currently controlled by the U.S. 
federal government and other large national governments can 
be handled by smaller regional or local governments, as dra-
matically demonstrated by the success of small nations such as 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Denmark, New Zealand, and oth-
 
 65. Id.; see also SIKATA BANERJEE, WARRIORS IN POLITICS: HINDU NA-
TIONALISM, VIOLENCE, AND THE SHIV SENA IN INDIA 35–52 (2000) (detailing 
similar riots involving the Shiv Sena Party in Jogeshwari, Behrampada, 
Dharavi, and Govandi/Deonar). 
 66. This Section builds on ideas first developed in Somin, Foot Voting, Po-
litical Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, supra note 60. 
 67. SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 
167. 
 68. See Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional De-
sign, supra note 60, at 221–23; see also SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL 
IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 167. 
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ers.69 These countries—which are smaller than many U.S. 
states, and even some U.S. cities—have independent policies on 
health care, education, social security, and many other issues, 
yet perform relatively well and seem not to suffer from an in-
sufficient size and scale.70 More systematic research also finds 
that larger democracies generally perform no better than 
smaller ones, which suggests that size is not an advantage, at 
least not for handling most issues.71 
The optimal distribution of power between different levels 
of government cannot be determined by reference to foot voting 
alone; a variety of other considerations must also be weighed. 
But enhancing opportunities for foot voting is a major consider-
ation in favor of greater decentralization. 
Foot voting can also be enhanced by political institutions 
that promote competitive rather than cooperative federalism.72 
If regional and local governments are required to raise all or 
most of their own funds by taxing their own residents, as in the 
competitive federalism model, they will have stronger incen-
tives to adopt policies that offer attractive options to potential 
migrants in order to increase revenue.73 By contrast, coopera-
tive federalism, under which lower-level governments get all or 
most of their funding from the central government, undermines 
incentives to adopt effective policies that promote develop-
ment.74 
In some situations, there is a danger that competition will 
result in a race to the bottom, in which jurisdictions try to at-
tract businesses in ways that harm ordinary citizens: for exam-
ple, by allowing firms to take actions that damage the envi-
 
 69. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 
227–28 (discussing the ability of small countries to successfully handle policies 
on these issues). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DE-
MOCRACY (1973) (providing a seminal discussion of the subject). 
 72. For a discussion of competitive and cooperative federalism, see, for 
example, THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG 
GOVERNMENTS 1–33 (1990). 
 73. See, e.g., Somin, Foot Voting, supra note 7; Barry Weingast, The Eco-
nomic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Eco-
nomic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995) (discussing the benefits of 
competitive federalism for development).  
 74. See Weingast, supra note 73. 
 1664 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1649 
 
ronment.75 However, race-to-the-bottom concerns are greatly 
overstated on both theoretical and empirical grounds.76 
The theoretical flaw in the race to the bottom argument is 
that rational revenue-oriented jurisdictions must focus not only 
on attracting businesses, but also on attracting workers and 
other taxpayers, many of whom care about environmental qual-
ity and other similar quality-of-life issues.77 Those preferences 
are also often shared by business interests that seek to employ 
such workers, especially high-skilled ones, if only because they 
would have to pay higher wages to attract such workers to 
places with poor environmental amenities.78 Wealthier workers 
and taxpayers (the sort governments are often especially eager 
to attract) are particularly likely to be willing to sacrifice addi-
tional income for environmental quality.79 Empirically, subna-
tional governments have often pioneered forms of environmen-
tal protection faster than central governments, and do not seem 
to systematically favor would-be polluters at the expense of 
other potential migrants.80  
This is not to suggest that subnational governments are 
immune from capture by business interests that might lobby 
 
 75. For a summary and defense of the race to the bottom theory, see 
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There A “Race” 
and Is It “To The Bottom?,” 48 HASTINGS L.J. 274, 274–369 (1997). For other 
modern defenses, see, for example, Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Facts 
are Stubborn Things: An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate 
Over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 COR-
NELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Impera-
tive (But Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protec-
tion, 7 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997). 
 76. For leading theoretical critiques, see Richard Revesz, The Race to the 
Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 
82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997) (responding to critics and defending his prior 
challenge of race-to-the-bottom arguments) [hereinafter Revesz, The Race to 
the Bottom]; Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethink-
ing the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (challenging the strength of race-to-the-bottom 
arguments). 
 77. See Revesz, The Race to the Bottom, supra note 76, at 538–40. I dis-
cuss these issues in more detail in SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNO-
RANCE, supra note 25, at 168–69. 
 78. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 
168–69. 
 79. For a summary of the relevant evidence on this point, see Ilya Somin 
& Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic Development Takings 
and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 623, 663–65 (2006). 
 80. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 
168–69 (citing relevant studies). 
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for excessive pollution or other policies that enable them to 
benefit at the expense of the interests of the general public. Far 
from it.81 But there is no inherent reason why such capture is 
more of a danger at the local and regional level than with cen-
tral governments. The possibility of foot voting also puts con-
straints on such rent-seeking, as jurisdictions especially prone 
to it are likely to lose investors and taxpayers over time.82 
Foot voting may have less to offer minority groups in the 
many federal systems where they are actually the majority in a 
few regions, but widely despised elsewhere. Many federal sys-
tems were established for the specific purpose of giving region-
ally concentrated minorities a jurisdiction of their own, thereby 
helping to mitigate ethnic conflict.83 In such situations, it might 
be difficult or even impossible for individuals to move to a re-
gion dominated by another ethnic group. 
For example, an Iraqi Kurd moving into a majority-Arab 
province might reasonably fear violence or, at least, discrimina-
tion. Even in the absence of overt hostility, such minority 
groups might face painful cultural and linguistic adjustments if 
they move out of their home regions. A French Canadian who 
moves from Quebec to Alberta is unlikely to face ethnic violence 
or even much in the way of discrimination. Even so, moving to 
a majority Anglophone province might still be a difficult deci-
sion, with substantial transition costs. 
Nonetheless, foot voting is still potentially useful under 
such conditions. The federal system in question can—and often 
should—include multiple majority-minority districts.84 For ex-
ample, the French-speaking minority in Switzerland can choose 
between multiple majority-French cantons. Similarly, Iraq has 
 
 81. For some examples of such capture caused, in part, by misinformation, 
see generally DAVID SCHULTZ, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE AGE OF IGNORANCE: 
WHY LAWMAKERS CHOOSE BELIEF OVER RESEARCH 108–13 (2013) (discussing 
examples of states in the United States that have fallen victim to interest 
group capture, often resulting from misinformation). 
 82. For a discussion of how foot voting constrains corruption, see Sunita 
Parikh & Barry Weingast, A Comparative Theory of Federalism: India, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 1593, 1604–06 (1997) (analyzing India through a comparative federal 
performance model to examine the performance of the system and the impact 
of corruption in India). 
 83. See generally DAWN BRANCATI, PEACE BY DESIGN: MANAGING INTRA-
STATE CONFLICT BY DECENTRALIZATION (2009) (discussing many such exam-
ples from around the world). 
 84. For other potential advantages of such a system, see Donald L. Horo-
witz, The Many Uses of Federalism, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 953, 958–62 (2007). 
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three majority-Kurdish provinces, albeit partially unified under 
the Kurdistan Regional Government.85 
Where there is only one majority-minority region, it is 
worth considering the possibility of breaking it up to form mul-
tiple jurisdictions. French Canadians would likely enjoy a 
broader array of foot-voting options if Quebec were divided into 
several smaller provinces rather than remain one big one. 
I do not suggest that any particular majority-minority ju-
risdiction must necessarily be divided in order to facilitate foot 
voting; other considerations would also have to be weighed be-
fore reaching that conclusion in any given case. But the foot-
voting benefits of partitions should not be neglected. 
Such arrangements can allow even regionally concentrated 
minorities a degree of choice. That range of choice can be fur-
ther expanded if more power is devolved to local governments, 
rather than just regional ones. Even if it is impossible to form 
more than one majority-minority regional government, that re-
gion may have many local governments that could potentially 
compete with each other. 
B. FACILITATING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
Some of the greatest potential gains from expanding foot 
voting are those to be had from freeing up international migra-
tion.86 From the standpoint of both economic development and 
a variety of noneconomic interests, the difference between liv-
ing in a poor nation and a more developed one vastly outweighs 
the difference between living in the worst region of an ad-
vanced nation and the best. But it is also fair to say that inter-
national foot voting faces stronger and more widespread and 
vociferous opposition than internal foot voting. In both the 
United States and many European nations, strong nationalist 
movements have arisen that not only oppose expanding immi-
gration but advocate greatly reducing it from existing levels.87 
 
 85. For a discussion of Kurdish government, see generally STEPHEN 
MANSFIELD, THE MIRACLE OF THE KURDS: A REMARKABLE STORY OF HOPE 
REBORN IN NORTHERN IRAQ (2014). 
 86. See discussion supra Part I. 
 87. See Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise 
of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash (Harvard Uni. Ken-
nedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP16-026, Nov. 2016), https://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818659; Conor Friedersdorf, What Right-
Wing Populist Movements Share: Blaming Immigrants, ATLANTIC (June 29, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/what-right-wing 
-populist-movements-share-blaming-immigrants/532023. 
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This opposition will not be easily overcome. But the vast 
gains to be had from expanded migration rights make it imper-
ative to try. Even incremental increases in international foot-
voting opportunities can save millions of people from what 
would otherwise be a lifetime of poverty and oppression. In the 
nineteenth century, many millions of poor and oppressed peo-
ple were able to migrate to relatively freer societies with great-
er opportunities, such as the United States, Canada, and Aus-
tralia, thanks in large part to the paucity of migration controls 
during that period.88 If border controls are reduced, the lower 
transportation costs created by modern technology make such 
movement easier today. 
Many objections have been offered to the idea of greatly 
expanding international migration rights.89 These include fears 
that it will increase crime and terrorism, reduce the wages of 
natives,90 overburden the welfare state, cause the enactment of 
harmful policies supported by immigrant voters, and lead to 
the spread of dangerous cultural values.91 I cannot review and 
assess these objections in detail here. But it is possible to 
sketch out a general framework for addressing them. 
First, many of the standard objections to free international 
migration are significantly overblown. For example, the availa-
ble evidence indicates that increased immigration does not lead 
to increases in per capita welfare spending.92 At least in the 
United States, immigrants actually have a much lower crime 
 
 88. For an overview, see MASSIMO LIVI-BACCI, A SHORT HISTORY OF MI-
GRATION 46–57 (Carl Ipsen trans., Polity Press 2012). 
 89. I plan to discuss these concerns in far greater detail in SOMIN, FREE 
TO MOVE, supra note 2. 
 90. See, e.g., BORJAS, supra note 16, at 79–148; PHILIP CAFARO, HOW 
MANY IS TOO MANY? THE PROGRESSIVE ARGUMENT FOR REDUCING IMMIGRA-
TION INTO THE UNITED STATES 33–54 (2015) (claiming that cheap immigrant 
labor lowers wages and benefits for natives, disproportionately impacting the 
poor). 
 91. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES 
TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 141–294 (2004) (claiming that immigration 
threatens American identity and values). 
 92. See, e.g., ALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD L. GLAESER, FIGHTING POV-
ERTY IN THE US AND EUROPE: A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE (2004) (indicating that 
European nations with greater immigration actually have lower welfare 
spending than those with more); Zachary Gochenour & Alexander Nowrasteh, 
The Political Externalities of Immigration: Evidence from the United States 
(Cato Inst., Working Paper No. 14, Jan. 2014), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato 
.org/files/pubs/pdf/working-paper-14-3.pdf (providing evidence from American 
states). 
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rate than native-born citizens do.93 Similarly, the risk that an 
American will be killed by an immigrant terrorist is so infini-
tesimal that it is actually several times lower than the risk that 
he or she will be killed by a lightning strike.94 
Where immigration creates genuine problems and negative 
side effects, it is often possible to deal with the issue by means 
of “keyhole solutions” that minimize the risk without barring 
large numbers of immigrants.95 If, for example, immigration 
does impose excessive burdens on the welfare state, receiving 
nations could abolish or reduce welfare payments to mi-
grants.96 Excluding immigrants from welfare benefits might be 
unjust. But it is surely less so than forcing them to endure the 
far greater material deprivation of being condemned to poverty 
for the rest of their lives in an underdeveloped nation. Similar-
ly, if there is a credible danger that immigrant voters will cause 
the enactment of harmful or unjust government policies, the 
obvious solution is to tighten eligibility for the franchise. 
In the United States, for example, immigrants cannot be-
come citizens unless they have lived in the country for five 
years, demonstrate a knowledge of the English language, and 
pass a civics test that many native-born citizens would fail.97 If 
necessary, such standards could be made even more stringent. 
Tests could become tougher, naturalization periods can be ex-
tended, and so on. Governments can make freedom of move-
 
 93. For a review of the relevant studies and evidence, see MARY C. WA-
TERS & MARISA GERSTEIN PINEAU, NAT’L ACAD. SCI., THE INTEGRATION OF 
IMMIGRANTS INTO AMERICAN SOCIETY 326–44 (2015). 
 94. According to the National Weather Service, an average of twenty-
seven Americans were killed by lightning over the past decade. Lightning 
Deaths at All-Time Record Low in 2017, USA TODAY (Jan. 2, 2018), https:// 
www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2018/01/02/lightning-deaths-all-time-record-
low-2017/996949001/. By contrast, the annual incidence of death by immigrant 
terrorists is far lower. See Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorism and Immigration: A 
Risk Analysis, CATO INST. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.cato.org/publications/ 
policy-analysis/terrorism-immigration-risk-analysis. 
 95. For examples of such proposals see Bryan Caplan, Why Should We Re-
strict Immigration?, 32 CATO J. 5 (2012). I will further outline such ideas in 
SOMIN, FREE TO MOVE, supra note 2. 
 96. Cf. MARTIN RUHS, THE PRICE OF RIGHTS: REGULATING INTERNATION-
AL LABOR MIGRATION (2013) (arguing that limiting the welfare rights of labor 
migrants can enable increased migration). 
 97. SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 
212. 
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ment easier while making it tougher for new immigrants to be-
come citizens or acquire certain other types of rights.98 
Long-term exclusion from the franchise may be unfair or 
unjust to immigrants. But it is a lesser injustice than excluding 
them from the country entirely, which would condemn most to 
a lifetime of poverty and oppression. In most of their home na-
tions, the would-be migrants also have little or no influence 
over public policy. This is particularly true in the many nations 
that have authoritarian governments or are only partly demo-
cratic. 
Where other keyhole solutions might be inadequate, poli-
cymakers should also consider tapping the vast wealth created 
by immigration to mitigate negative side effects that cannot be 
addressed in other ways. If, for example, immigration drives 
down the wages of native low-skilled workers and this is con-
sidered a morally unacceptable outcome, national governments 
can impose a surtax on the incomes of recent immigrants and 
redistribute the wealth to those native workers whose wages 
have been depressed.99 
Like exclusion from welfare benefits and the franchise, 
such discriminatory taxation may be unjust. But it, like other 
keyhole solutions, still leaves the immigrants far better off than 
they would be if left out of the country entirely. Paying, say, a 
ten-percent-higher tax rate in a country where the immigrant 
earns three times as much as she would in her homeland still 
leaves her vastly better off than she would be otherwise. 
Along the same lines, if immigration does lead to an in-
crease in crime, tax revenue generated by the wealth it creates 
can be used to fund additional police forces and other law en-
forcement tools that can bring crime down again.100 Lowering 
migration barriers can potentially double world GDP.101 Some 
of that new wealth could be used to alleviate possible negative 
side-effects of migration, while still leaving enabling vast gains 
for both immigrants and natives. 
In sum, understandable objections to expanded migration 
should be addressed by a combination of assessing whether the 
objection is overblown, implementing keyhole solutions, and—
 
 98. See generally RUHS, supra note 96 (discussing a variety of such policy 
options). 
 99. See Caplan, supra note 95, at 9. 
 100. I will develop this proposal in greater detail in SOMIN, FREE TO MOVE, 
supra note 2. 
 101. See Clemens, supra note 15, at 84–89. 
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where necessary—tapping the wealth created by immigration 
to mitigate negative side effects and compensate adversely af-
fected natives.These strategies may not always be feasible. 
There may perhaps still be extreme situations where migration 
restrictions are the only possible way to prevent some great 
harm.102 But they can at least enable vastly freer migration 
than is currently feasible. 
Perhaps this assessment is too optimistic and keyhole poli-
cies can only enable a modest increase in migration. But even 
such a modest increase can still greatly enhance development 
and liberate millions of people from tyranny and privation. 
  CONCLUSION   
For many of the poorest and most oppressed people in the 
world, the most likely path to economic development and politi-
cal freedom runs through foot voting. Expanded foot voting can 
also do much for the relatively disadvantaged residents of more 
advanced nations. It is, furthermore, often a better mechanism 
for decision-making than conventional ballot-box voting. 
It will not be easy to overcome the many barriers to ex-
panding foot-voting opportunities, especially with respect to in-
ternational migration. Progress towards that objective is likely 
to be incremental. But even limited gains can make an enor-
mous difference. 
 
 102. I will consider a number of such possible scenarios in SOMIN, FREE TO 
MOVE, supra note 2. 
